This research project constitutes an important first attempt at locating the problem of corruption in the broader context of Philippine political economy in the light of more recent literature. Other attempts both here and abroad at analyzing the problem have frequently dealt only with the narrower question of designing mechanisms and deterrents to prevent corruption in specific instances, or have focused exclusively on the role specific forms of corruption plays in hindering development. While some rich material on corruption has been provided by mass media – most exemplary being the PCIJ -- a need still exists to digest this and locate it in the broader locus of social theorizing. Little has yet been written on the specific characteristics of Philippine corruption, as shaped by its peculiar social and historical circumstances. The papers arising from this project provide a useful strategic view, using case examples, of the relationship between corruption and development in the Philippines, which is often more complex than is first suggested by recent writing arising from the most recent wave of interest in corruption studies. The problem of defining the government's minimal scope, for example, when markets themselves are imperfect and corruptible is raised using concrete examples. The ambiguous response of corruption to large-scale innovations such as globalization, deregulation, and devolution is another problem area that is also tackled.

The first study, "Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and context" by Emmanuel S. de Dios and Ricardo D. Ferrer, proceeds from the more recent literature on corruption as a principal-agent problem whose significance for development depends on its dimensions related to the nature of the corrupt transaction itself which affect for better or worse the nature of the relationship between principal (as represented by the public interest) and the agent (politicians and bureaucrats). From this viewpoint, corruption may be regarded as an incentive-design problem. The paper argues that there is a larger dimension to corruption that is determined by the historical and social context., i.e. by factors affecting social cohesion (e.g., income and wealth, education, ethnic and other differences), the economic strategies pursued by the government (e.g., minimalist versus interventionist), the political system (the autonomy of the bureaucracy, the degree of centralisation), the extent of market transactions (local, global), and the rate and sources of economic growth. Under this framework, the paper examines how and why the dominant types of corruption in the Philippines have evolved, from nepotism, to smuggling, to public-works contracts, to debt-financed schemes, asset-privatisations, until the recent descent into underworld-related activities.

The second study investigates the industrial anatomy of corruption especially as it occurs in the area of government procurement, bidding and award of contracts funded both by the government and by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and ODA (official development assistance). It is divided into two parts.

Study 2a, "The industrial anatomy of corruption: Government procurement, bidding and award of contracts" by Amado M. Mendoza, Jr.,  identifies and describes the technologies used in the corrupt practice, the politico-economic players involved in whatever capacity, the enabling/disabling policy and socio-political environment, and the like. Study 2b, "Tender mercies: Contracts, concessions and privatization" by Marie Antoinette G. Virtucio and Melchor P. Lalunio,  re-examines corruption within the context of the government's procurement and tendering system—determining the factors and accounting for the circumstances that allow corruption to transpire and to take root. It specifically examines the alternatives, circumstances, processes and mechanisms (through which a particular choice was eventually selected by both government officials and contractors) using such cases as the privatization of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and the construction of the irrigation facilities in Tarlac.

The third study, "The detrimental role of biased policies: Framework and case studies" by Dr. Joseph Y. Lim and Mr. Clarence G. Pascual, explores how policies that emanate from processes that are not transparent and accountable would bring about negative impact on the economy. It is one of the few attempts in the Philippine setting to study corruption not from the perspective of ill-gotten wealth, or illegitimate and under-handed procurements and granting of contracts, or rent-seeking and its negative effects on the economy, but from the prescription of wrong policies to the advantage of narrow vested interests. It provides a discussion of how institutions and governance structures are vital to the economic development of the country and shows how the state transitions in the Philippines, as they historically unfolded, had not sufficiently strengthened these institutions and governance structures, and had not displaced the dominant clientelist type of relationship in the state bureaucracy and institutions. It tackles some "hot" issues that arose under the Estrada administration like the government 's handling of the case of insider trading on the Best World (BW) Resources stocks, the air war with Taiwan, and the jueteng payoff scandal.