Not many people know the result of the Fact Finding Commission’s report on the coup attempt last 27 July 2003. We are providing the public the opportunity to review this report so we can continue to advocate for transparency and accountability among our leaders, both civilian and military. Also, we must ensure that the recommendations of the Commission will be acted upon in the interest of justice.
In summary, the Commission concluded that the soldiers went to Oakwood not simply to air grievances but to take power in behalf of Gregorio Honasan and Joseph Estrada and to implement Honasan’s National Recovery Program.
The groups identified with Honasan (PGBI and Diablo) and Estrada (PMAP and DEMOKRASYA) were part of the civilian support group for a planned replication of “people power,” marching from various points including the EDSA Shrine towards Oakwood.
The following indicates extensive planning:
• wide recruitment of military personnel months before the mutiny at gripe sessions in which a bloodletting rite and the oath of loyalty were undertaken by recruits, such as the ones at the Galleria Suites and an old house in San Juan on 4 and 12 June 2003;
• purchase of uniforms and combat boots, Magdalo flags, and arm bands used at Oakwood;
• provision of rebels with backpacks purchased ahead of time;
• purchase of expensive communications equipment and vehicles later recovered;
• reservation by Capt. Gerardo Gambala under the name of George Uy for 19 to 28 July and his actual occupation of the room where Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes visited him on 24 July;
• rebels’ use of two staging points at Dasmariñas Village and Mandaluyong City; and
• prepositioning of rebel vehicles in the armories of Fort San Felipe and Sangley Point at Naval Base Cavite.
The discovery of the plot prompted the rebels to implement Plan Charlie of a three-plan Oplan Andres (from “The Last Revolution” and the recovered diskettes).
Discovery and Preemption
Fortuitous scheduling of the coup attempt close to the President’s 3rd SONA on 28 July helped in the timely adoption of countermeasures such as Task Force Libra (Abu) and Task Force Ayala (Teodosio).
But the government failed to prevent Marines from Ternate, Cavite from moving in to Oakwood and the rebels from occupying Oakwood.
Moreover, the rebels failed to elicit support from senior military officers, suggesting a) a breakdown in the chain of command; b) alienation of the rebels from their senior officers; and c) general decline of professionalism in the AFP.
Rebels also failed to elicit the required civilian support for a replication of “people power” other than the Honasan and Estrada support groups cited above.
Root Causes
The Commission cited the following root causes of the attempted coup:
• The “original sin” rooted in martial law where military role expansion occurred amidst the destruction of civilian democratic institutions;
• The failure of the law to deter, due to its inadequate or lack of enforcement;
• Civilian dependence on the military for political survival, internal security, etc.;
• Ambitious personalities recruiting and using the military for their personal and political agenda;
• The “messianic complex” bred by socialization in the PMA and the harshness of the realities on the ground; and
• Commanding officers are not diligent in instilling and enforcing the duty of soldiers to subordinate themselves to civilian authority, and the misinterpretation of the Constitutional provision on the role of the AFP as the savior of the people and the state.
Provocations
The main provocations were military grievances; discovery of the plot leading them to implement Plan Charlie (and not Plans Alpha and Bravo); dinner of PMA ’94 and ’95 members with President Arroyo on 23 July 2003; and the President’s order of arrest for officers and men unaccounted for on 26 July 2003.
But it is not to say that the soldiers don’t have valid grievances. Among which are the
a) RSBS issue;
b) procurement system prone to “corrupt” practices such as “conversion”, “washing”, split POs, rigged biddings, “ghost” deliveries, etc., especially by and with the collusion of the powerful “comptroller family”, also affecting POL;
c) sale or transfer of arms and ammo to unauthorized recipients;
d) modernization of the AFP and the Modernization Fund;
e) inadequate AFP grievance mechanism (IG and OESPA) due to hierarchy, seniority, military culture including obedience to superiors, etc.;
f) inadequate health, medical, housing, and other services;
g) poor state of military equipage; and
h) delays in payments of benefits to survivors of military personnel killed in action.
Negotiated Return to Barracks
The Commission further found out that: 1) the negotiation “to return to barracks” was actually under conditions of “mutual ignorance” of applicable laws; 2) there was priority for a peaceful and speedy end to the mutiny; and 3) there was unclear terms of reference for government negotiators.
Recommendations of the Commission
The Commission, in relation to the 27 July 2003 incident, has finally recommended the following:
1. Due diligence by commanding officers;
2. Effectively address legitimate grievances;
3. A civilian Secretary of National Defense;
4. Return NICA to its original mandate;
5. Enforce the law against violators;
6. Observe or respect the military’s political neutrality; and
7. Provide negotiators with clear terms of reference;
Concerning the grievances voiced by mutineers at Oakwood
1. Liquidate present Retirement and Separation Benefits System of the AFP in an orderly manner;
2. Return the soldiers’ RSBS contributions;
3. Initiate an AFP Service and Insurance System; and
4. Implement fully the recommendations of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee re: Ramiscal and Abadia.
The AFP Procurement System: Conversion and Other Problem
1. Simplify AFP procurement procedures;
2. Control commanders’ discretionary powers over the Centrally Managed Funds (CMF);
3. Reduce the amount of CMF in GHQ/service HQ hands;
4. Strictly implement control measures over supplies;
5. Set tenure limits for AFP finance and procurement officers; and
6. Establish an autonomous Internal Affairs office.
Modernizing the AFP: Funding and Consequential Problems
1. Vigorously pursue recovery of the JUSMAG and NOVAI properties;
2. Pursue the squatted land in Fort Bonifacio;
3. Substantially increase AFP’s share in Fort Bonifacio’s sale proceeds; and
4. Reinforce Office of the Ombudsman by increasing funding and other support.
Other recommendations include items on the state of the AFP medical services; the benefits for soldiers killed in action; the pilot to aircraft ratio or too few aircraft; and the inadequacies of AFP housing for officers and enlisted personnel. |
